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In 2012, Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein wrote of a paralysed US legislative branch, citing a 
major source of dysfunction as a “serious mismatch between political parties, which have become 
as vehemently adversarial as parliamentary parties, and a governing system that, unlike a 
parliamentary democracy, makes it extremely difficult for majorities to act.”1 They went on to cite 
Austin Ranney, who over sixty years ago argued that Westminster-style parliamentary parties 
“would be a disaster within the American constitutional system, given our separation of powers, 
separately elected institutions, and constraints on majority rule that favor cross-party coalitions and 
compromise.”2 
In its own constitutional conventions, from 1891 to 1898, Australia modelled large portions 
of their federalist government on the US Constitution, and is perhaps the most successful example 
of a fledgling nation borrowing extensively from the US Constitution and having a functional 
government result, creating, like America, “a successful federation of former British colonies under 
a written Constitution that preserved a balance between State and Federal powers.”3 Yet despite 
1 Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It's Even Worse Than it Looks (Basic Books, 2012), Introduction XIII. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Matthew Harvey, "James Bryce, 'The American Commonwealth', and the Australian Constitution," Australian Law 
Journal 76, no. 6 (2002), 373. 
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sharing so many fundamental federalist principles with the US, Australia's Constitution also 
embraces elements of the Westminster system – such as parliamentary-style parties and a 
responsible ministry housed within the legislative branch – without exhibiting the same dysfunction 
currently seen in the American system. This essay seeks to identify what it is in the US Constitution 
that causes America's government to grind to a halt when the parties begin behaving like 
parliamentary parties, while Australia's government, so similar to the United States' in its adoption 
of federalism, is able to function with a parliamentary-style system. 
Australia's founders in 1890, writes John S.F. Wright, were “conscious of a need to 
incorporate American institutions within the new commonwealth, but to also adapt them to 
Australian circumstances.”4 Through an examination of which elements of the US Constitution the 
Australian framers expressly changed or excluded from their own Constitution, it is possible to 
identify elements that are either too idiosyncratic to America to allow for transfer or that were 
identified as problematic prior to 1898. This essay will first outline the influential role of the US 
Constitution in the drafting of the Australian Constitution and how the US Constitution was 
approached by the Australian framers. The paper will then identify similarities in the social, 
political, and geographical environments that brought about each constitution, leading to a summary 
of the major features that Australia adopted from the US Constitution. It will then outline the 
differences in environment between America in the late 18th century and Australia in the late 19th 
century, identifying the philosophical differences between Australia's and America's framers. This 
will allow us to examine why Australia chose not to adopt certain elements of the US Constitution 
and, consequently, why these elements are idiosyncratic to the history and philosophy of America. 
Finally, by examining contemporaneous American responses to Australia's Constitution we will 
gain further insight into the attitudes of Americans towards their own Constitution. 
* * * 
                                                 
4 John S. F. Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution: James Bryce's Contribution to Australian 
Federalism," Publius 31, no. 4 (2001), 120. 
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There were a handful of men among Australia’s framers familiar with US history and institutions 
who were able to bring in-depth insights of America's Constitution and political system into the 
Australian drafting process. Andrew Inglis Clark was, in particular, “probably the only one who 
really comprehended many of the all-important nuances of the political contexts which have always 
been a necessary background to really understanding the working of the United States 
Constitution…”5 In contrast, most other Australian framers were familiar with the US Constitution 
only through James Bryce's The American Commonwealth, published in 1888, and had themselves 
not personally experienced the ordering of American governmental affairs, nor had any great 
correspondence with Americans. As such, The American Commonwealth became a focal point of 
the Conventions’ deliberations. 6 
 John Reynolds wrote in 1958 “That our Constitution so closely resembles that of the United 
States is due in a very large degree to the influence of Mr A. I. Clark.”7 Whilst most of our framers 
were aware of American Constitutional institutions through the writings of Bryce, divorced as they 
were from the historical and philosophical context behind those institutions, it still took someone 
with knowledge of, and reverence for, those institutions on a philosophical level to push for them to 
be in Australia's Constitution. As such, Australia's departures from the US Constitution can be seen 
not just as pragmatic departures but also philosophical ones, largely due to the representation of 
American history and philosophy in the Australian conventions through the presence of AI Clark 
and a few others which were then tempered and deliberately resisted by the rest of the assembly. 
The American Commonwealth was kept on the table for reference during the conventional debates 
and at the Melbourne convention was cited far more commonly than any other work, with 70 
citations recorded. By contrast, The Federalist Papers themselves – a series of essays that speak, to 
                                                 
5 Alex C. Castles, "The Voyage of the 'Lucinda' and the Drafting of the Australian Constitution in 1891," Australian 
Law Journal 65, no. 5 (1991), 278. 
6 Ibid. 
7 J.A. Reynolds, "A. I. Clark's American Sympathies and His Influence on Australian Federation," Australian Law 
Journal 32 (1958), 65. 
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a large part, to the philosophical arguments in favour of republican federalism – were referenced 
only 25 times.8 By far the most important precedent for Australia's framers were the United States, 
and Bryce's work was the chief point of access and elucidation for the majority of them.9 It 
“provided guidance as to the operation of federalism in a general sense and illustrated the pitfalls 
and benefits of particular constitutional arrangements.”10 
Wright argues that Bryce's particular approach to the US Constitution was suited to the 
Australian framers’ approach to their own Constitution. Contrasting himself with Tocqueville, 
Bryce argued that Tocqueville's conclusions were based “not so much on an analysis of American 
phenomena as on general views of democracy which the circumstances of France had suggested.”11 
Bryce, rather, sought to “paint the institutions and the people of America as they are,” describing the 
function of U.S. institutions in isolation from their philosophical origins and development.12, 13 
Consequently, the Australian framers, after reading Bryce, were predisposed to make only an 
assessment of what worked and what didn't in the US Constitution, almost completely divorced 
from a reading of why it ought to work and what the intended outcomes were. 
 According to Wright, Bryce had interpreted American Government in Darwinian terms, 
“implying that environmental conditions had controlled both the intellectual and political 
development of American government.”14 Reviewing the book in 1889, Woodrow Wilson had both 
praise and criticism for Bryce. He wrote that Bryce had approached the US Constitution in the 
“practical, every-day light of comparative politics” and identified Bryce's chief contribution of the 
work as his impartial description of the political institutions that had developed in America: “The 
forms and principles of the federal system are explained both historically and practically and are 
                                                 
8 Harvey, “James Bryce, 'The American Commonwealth',” 362, 366. 
9 Ibid, 365, 363. 
10 Ibid, 363. 
11 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1888), 4-5. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 109. 
14 Ibid, 110. 
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estimated with dispassionate candor.”15 Yet he also cautioned that if philosophical factors were 
ignored, there could be nothing particularly novel about American institutions when compared to 
British institutions.16 They became “simply the normal institutions of the Englishman in 
America.”17 
 It is this interpretation of US Institutions, divested of their philosophical and historical 
origins, which formed the framework through which Australia's framers adopted these institutions. 
Absent of the philosophical reasoning behind the US Constitution, they were able to adopt only 
those elements that would be practically appropriate for Australia. Most often, those elements that 
Australia chose to adapt came about due to similarities in Australia's circumstances and 
environment to America's. 
 Take, for instance, Woodrow Wilson's argument that Bryce's view reduced America's 
institutions to “simply the normal institutions of the Englishman in America.” Jack P. Greene points 
out that many of the individual legal protections in America's colonies did not change before and 
after the US revolution,18 indicating that, to some extent, America's tradition of the protection of 
individual rights has its ancestry in the principles of English common law.19 In this context, that 
America's legal institutions can be seen as an American adaptation of English institutions, so too 
can Australia's legal institutions be interpreted as simply the normal institutions of the Englishman 
in Australia. If the institutions of the English functioned in America when suitably adapted, then 
Australia, being also a 'country of Englishmen', would be able to adopt those elements in instances 
where Australia's and America's environments were similar. 
 There are many similarities in the environments and conditions of Australia's and America's 
founding. Both were founded predominantly by English emigrants. Both nations occupy whole 
                                                 
15 Woodrow Wilson, “Bryce's American Commonwealth,” Political Science Quarterly 4 (March 1889), 153, 155. 
16 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 110. 
17 Wilson, “Bryce's American Commonwealth,” 164. 
18 Jack P. Greene, “The American Revolution,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 105, No. 1 (Feb, 2000), 102. 
19 Ibid, 95. 
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continents, each of similar size, meaning that stronger localised governments would better serve a 
unified, federal government than in a smaller nation. Due to the concentration of Australia's 
population in each of the colonies' capital cities, and because the cities were separated by such vast 
distances, the centralised Canadian model would not do for Australia.20 As such, America's model 
served as the best example, for Australians, of federalism over a continent. 
 As in America’s original thirteen colonies, pre-federation Australia consisted of both 
powerful colonies and less influential ones. The smaller colonies wanted full recognition of states' 
rights under federation, arguing that “a stronger House of Representatives would advance the 
interests of the large colonies at the expense of the smaller ones.”21 This situation is analogous to 
the circumstances and conflicts embodied in America's Great Compromise. 
 Pre-federation Australia experienced a shift towards democracy as the arrival of free 
emigrants from England grew in number, and this landless emigrant majority sought to upset the 
balance of power with those wealthy land-owners and squatters who had arrived before them.22 This 
dynamic bears a resemblance to the formation of the “latently republican” local governments in pre-
revolutionary America, where societies were developing absent an aristocracy or legally established 
system of ranks, even long before the revolution.23 When James Bryce visited Australia in the early 
twentieth century, he attributed the speedy arrival of democracy in the colonies to sociological 
factors. Whereas ancient social and economic traditions had frustrated reform of the British 
Constitution, the early free immigrants to New South Wales had, like Americans, been without a 
tradition of deference to social rank.24 
 In Federalist #39, Madison offered an analysis of the US Constitution that mediated 
between two views on the source of sovereignty in American federalism. Each view held that there 
                                                 
20 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 119. 
21 Harvey, “James Bryce, 'The American Commonwealth',” 369. 
22 Wright "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 116. 
23 Greene, “The American Revolution,” 97. 
24 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 115. 
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could only be one sovereign entity within a particular system, but each view differed as to where 
that sovereignty rested – with the people of the nation as a whole; or with the several individual 
states. As such, Madison suggested that the US Constitution consisted of both 'national' and 
'compactual' elements.25, 26 
 Australia's framers were familiar with this debate as Bryce had couched it in terms 
consistent with Madison's: a “Commonwealth of commonwealths, a Republic of republics, a state 
which, while one, is nevertheless composed of other states even more essential to its existence than 
it is to theirs.”27, 28 Richard Chaffey Baker, an influential Australian framer, concurred with this 
view. Though he preferred that sovereignty should be derived from the nation's people, his chief 
objective was the increase of powers of self-government for the Australian people, and believed this 
would best be served by the delegation of those powers to both a federal government and the pre-
existing colonial governments. For Baker, equal representation of the people in the House and the 
states in the Senate, in line with the US model, was seen as 'the very essence' of federation.29 
Australia's adoption of federalism in this manner was shaped profoundly by the US interpretation of 
federalism, as this was the system best suited to Australia's needs. 
 Although similarities between their respective environments resulted in Australia adopting 
the federalist principles of the US Constitution, the differences between their environments resulted 
in significant adaptations to and departures from the US Constitution. As Walter G. Beach (an 
American observer) noted in 1899, Australia was a “notable instance of the formation of a 
federation without immediate external danger upon the people.”30 One of the chief differences 
between the two environments was that America, at the time of its founding, had recently won 
                                                 
25 Nicholas Aroney, "Imagining a Federal Commonwealth: Australian Conceptions of Federalism, 1890-1901." 
Federal Law Review 30, no. 2 (2002), 271, 272. 
26 James Madison, “Federalist #39,” in The Federalist Papers. 
27 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol. 1, 332. 
28 Aroney, "Imagining a Federal Commonwealth,” 272. 
29 Ibid, 283. 
30 Walter G. Beach, "The Australian Federal Constitution," Political Science Quarterly 14, no. 4 (1899), 680. 
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independence from England and was wary of further and continued threats to its security. Australia's 
founders recognised this, John Cockburn stating that in 1787, America was “surrounded by 
enemies, north and south, and the navigation of their rivers was impeded by foreign interference. … 
their case was altogether different from that which presents itself to us.”31 
 Having fought a war to free themselves from sovereignty to a distant monarch, America was 
also seeking to distance itself from the monarchic and aristocratic institutions of England, whereas 
Australia was still nominally under British control. Under that circumstance, it makes sense that 
Australia adopted a parliamentary system that resembled the party system of their 'rulers', as it had 
been informally passed down through the formation of the colonial governments; whereas America 
sought a system of checks and balances predicated on compromise and the frustration of both 
factional influences and popular will to exert total authority, in rebellion against the idea that too 
much power should be concentrated within any one person or institution. 
 Andrew Inglis Clark “saw a continuity between the English Revolution of 1688 and its 
resulting Bill of Rights and the American Revolution of 1775 and the consequent “United States 
Constitution and Bill of Rights.”32 Australia, a nation founded from a position of peace and stability, 
has no bill of rights, although one was drafted but not included in the Australian Constitution. The 
US Constitution's Bill of Rights and its greater emphasis on the protection of individual freedoms 
can be attributed to its struggle for independence, which led to its greater sensitivity to potential 
infractions upon these freedoms. 
 America's heavy reliance on checks & balances and a separation of powers may be seen as 
another result of this major difference in environment. America was the first modern nation to 
attempt republican federalism on a large scale. Many of the choices that Australia made differently 
to America, such as the direct election of Senators and the refusal of an executive external to the 
                                                 
31 John Cockburn, Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, ed. G.S. Chapman (Sydney Legal 
Books, 1986), 131. 
32 William G. Buss "Andrew Inglis Clark's Draft Constitution, Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, and the Assist 
from Article III of the Constitution of the United States." Melbourne University Law Review 33, no. 3 (2009), 720. 
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legislative branch, hinged upon being able to observe how those institutions had operated in 
America over the previous 100 years. So much of what is idiosyncratic to the US Constitution is 
simply on account of their having gone first. Their only prior, comparable, contemporaneous 
example of republican and federalist ideas was their own Articles of Confederation, a hastily 
constructed wartime document so glaringly ill equipped to govern a confederation of colonies 
(lacking, as it did, the ability to enforce legislation) that it led to major economic and security issues 
within less than a decade and only the broadest lessons of federalism could be discerned from it as a 
negative role model. 
 The Australian Constitutional debates took place over seven years and their Constitution was 
drafted by “experienced parliamentarians, honed in the practice of drafting legislative proposals, 
amendments, etc., at great speed, all whilst negotiating the sometimes chaotic colonial parliaments 
of Australia.”33 These 'parliamentarians' had behind them a political tradition of stable colonial self-
government of almost fifty years and were more practiced in the art of parliamentary democracy 
than even the members of the British Cabinet in the House of Commons.34 Contrast this to the 
American experience, where they had recently come out of a war and were compelled to form a 
largely new Constitution over a period of only a few months. By comparison, the Americans were 
winging it. 
 In keeping with the practical scientific spirit of the late 19th century, Australia's framers 
“approached the drafting of the federal constitution as if it were a professional, even quasi-scientific 
discipline.”35 In this sense, Australia's founders were very much unlike the American founders of 
the previous century, “not interested in establishing whether the basis of government lay in a social 
contract, or whether a mixed form of government was preferable to either a monarchic, a 
                                                 
33 Castles, "The Voyage of the 'Lucinda'," 278. 
34 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 108. 
35 Ibid, 113. 
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democratic, or an aristocratic regime,” as the Americans were.36 For the Australians, “this old 
period of philosophical debate had closed,” whereas for Americans, their engagement with these 
choices and the political philosophy behind their approach formed the basis of their Constitution.37 
America's Constitution is idiosyncratic to the debates over democracy and republicanism that were 
being held at that time. 
 Beach also recognised these philosophical differences. He noted that in Australia's 
conventions the example of the United States was quoted on nearly every subject, and that there 
was a strong tendency to be guided by the US Constitution in areas such as the question of a federal 
supreme court, the relative position of the two legislative houses, the method of electing senators, 
money bills, and state equality. But Beach also recognised that “on many other points the 
disapproval of our system was marked; and the federal type itself was adopted, not so much because 
of our example, as because the conditions of Australian political life demanded it.”38 
 The American framers’ approach towards government can be seen in Baker's objections to 
the relationship between the Executive and the Legislature in the US Constitution: 
 
“The administration does not even work as a whole. It is not a whole; it is a group of 
persons each individually dependent on and amenable to the President, but with no joint 
policy and no collective responsibility; its branches are unconnected – their efforts are 
not devoted to one aim, do not produce one harmonious result.”39 
 
Whereas Australia desired a harmonious result, the US framers, by contrast, concerned as they were 
with the “tyranny of faction”, sought to avoid situations where a harmonious result could be too 
easily attained and crafted a Constitution that did not necessarily allow for the efforts of their 
                                                 
36 Ibid, 113-114. 
37 Ibid, 114. 
38 Beach, "The Australian Federal Constitution," 671. 
39 Richard Baker, The Executive in a Federation (Adelaide: C.E. Bristow, Government Printer, 1897), 11. 
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various branches to be 'devoted to one aim'.40 
 America's employment of extensive checks and balances can also be viewed in context of 
their free standing as an independent nation. Australia's framers “faced the position that they were 
going in for absolute legislative independence for Australia as far as it could possibly exist 
consistent with allegiance to the Crown, and also consistent with the power of the Imperial 
Parliament to legislate for the whole Empire when it chose.”41 America's federal government, 
formed without deference to a legislative power above it, required greater internal stability, in the 
form of balancing and diffusing power between a greater number of branches. 
 Over the course of Australia's conventions, the Senate moved away from the American 
model of republican checks and balances and more toward the utilitarian ideal of democratic 
participation and review.42 In debate over money bills, the Senate's powers were defended in terms 
of the chamber's lesser connection with the national people, rather than on the basis of the American 
precedent.43 This supports the notion that the US Constitution is more grounded in the republican 
philosophy that all men oscillate between virtue and corruption than in a utilitarian ideal.44 This 
balance in the US Constitution away from utilitarianism, as a whole, may account for why the US 
Government is experiencing such partisan gridlock today. When the political actors within the 
system begin to behave in an ideologically rigid manner rather than a utilitarian one – i.e. failing to 
compromise within a system that, due to its structured lack of utilitarianism, is predicated upon 
compromise – a system already weighted against utilitarianism will struggle to function. 
Beach noted that Australia's adoption of the cabinet system – housing a responsible ministry 
in the House of Representatives – afforded more power and influence to the lower house, writing 
that “the house to which the ministry is responsible must, in the nature of things, be the ruling 
                                                 
40 James Madison, “Federalist #10,” in The Federalist Papers. 
41 Reynolds, "A. I. Clark's American Sympathies,” 66. 
42 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 128. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, 125. 
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body.”45 Evidence of the reasons behind Australia's willingness to give greater influence to their 
lower house may be found in Bryce's American Commonwealth: “American politics have never 
turned upon an antagonism between these two sets of commonwealths ... although small states 
might be supposed to be specially zealous for States' rights, the tendency to uphold them has been 
no stronger in the Senate than in the House.”46 Australians were able to observe that there was no 
less likelihood of larger states than smaller states to want to uphold states' rights, so they could 
afford more power to their lower House by placing the formation of Government there. The US 
House of Representatives and US Senate are afforded equal power largely due to the American 
framers' commitment to the principles of federalism and the maintenance of an equal balance 
between the people's rights and states' rights. In the Americans' view, the existence of an executive 
branch external to the legislative branch is necessary to ensure that the two houses of Congress 
retain equal power and thus maintain the sanctity of The Great Compromise, as alluded to by 
Beach: “Substantial equality between the two legislative houses is possible under our system, but 
the cabinet system makes this quite impossible.”47 
 Through this example it can be argued that America may have arranged things differently 
had they had any like contemporaneous examples to observe, such as Australia had. America's more 
dogged adherence to a purer federalism, embodied in the Great Compromise, may be seen as a 
product of their being the first large modern federalist nation. Indeed, the United States passed the 
17th Amendment to their Constitution, allowing for the direct election of senators, twelve years after 
Australia ratified its own Constitution, wherein the method of the election of senators was left to the 
incoming federal government to determine. (The first Australian government opted for the direct 
election of senators, as was intended.)48 This is not to say that the United States were directly 
following Australia's example, but it does show that they did modify their own Constitution in line 
                                                 
45 Beach, "The Australian Federal Constitution," 677. 
46 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol. 1, 182. 
47 Beach, "The Australian Federal Constitution," 677. 
48 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 127. 
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with more modern federalist principles being practiced elsewhere on the globe. 
 Further to the election of Senators, Australia almost departed from the American model of 
large-scale elections, not wanting to employ state-sized electorates for the election of Senators on 
the belief that “enlarged electorates were riddled with 'evil' consequences.” Edmund Barton, 
president of the 1897-1898 convention, “acknowledged that enlarged electorates had originally been 
introduced into the United States Constitution 'to relieve the minds of the electors of all local, petty, 
and parochial interests.'”49 Whereas Australia's framers wanted to enhance democratic participation 
and saw large electorates as a barrier to this, James Madison believed that ordinary people were 
incapable of electing suitable political representatives, so he “argued for large-scale democratic 
elections in order to diminish participation and preserve republican liberty,”50 an argument very 
much grounded in philosophy. America's employment of large-scale elections is another element 
that serves its republican ideal over utilitarian democracy. 
 Australia rejected the American form of executive, opting instead for responsible ministry 
and a British-style cabinet. Bryce had written that America had rejected the British-style cabinet on 
the account that “they could not adopt it because they did not know of its existence. ... But as the 
idea never presented itself, we cannot say that it was rejected...”51 But Baker asserted that the 
rejection of the British-style cabinet was “to keep the Executive entirely apart from and 
uncontrolled by the Legislature. They were also greatly afraid of giving the President or his 
Ministers any opportunity of corrupting the Legislatures.”52 He goes on to write that the American-
style executive was crafted specifically to avoid a resemblance to the British model, and that the 
care taken to demonstrate this in The Federalist Papers shows the state of public opinion.53 
Whether Bryce or Baker is correct, the existence of a unitary executive in a branch of government 
                                                 
49 Ibid, 126. 
50 Ibid, 125. 
51 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol. 1, 279. 
52 Baker, The Executive in a Federation, 10. 
53 Ibid, 11. 
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separate to the legislature can be traced to historical context – either to the newness of the British 
cabinet or to the specific anti-British sentiment in America at the time. Australia was dealing with 
no such circumstances during its constitutional conventions and ratification. 
 James Lee-Steere, a delegate at the 1891 Australian convention, said that “Bryce, in his 
history, says that there has never been any serious deadlock between the two houses. There are often 
conflicts between them, but they are invariably settled by a compromise.”54 At the Sydney session 
of the 1897 convention it was said that “deadlock provisions were not necessary in the United States 
Constitution because the executive was not directly a party to the deadlock,” and Bryce was 
invoked, as he had warned in American Commonwealth that “the lack of a deadlock procedure led 
to more serious consequences where the British-style cabinet system existed.”55 Consequently, a 
means to resolve legislative deadlocks – the double dissolution election – was introduced into the 
Australian Constitution, while still none exists in the US Constitution. The result is a more 
functional Australian government whilst the US federal government has often experienced 
deadlocks throughout its history, occurring with increasing regularity in recent years. 
 This may be seen as one of the chief reasons the US Constitution falters with parliamentary-
style parties. America's framers, through the use of checks & balances, and multiple points of veto, 
would have avoided a means for resolving legislative deadlocks as this could foreseeably have 
opened the door to factional influences using it to push legislation through. Such a constitutional 
system is appropriate when there is a political culture amenable to compromise, but it requires a 
political body that adheres to the philosophy and spirit with which the Constitution was written. 
When parties act as ideological blocs and the exact letter of the Constitution is followed absent this 
spirit of compromise and cooperation, it can, as noted by Mann & Ornstein, cease to function. 
Being a document grounded in republican ideals rather than democratic utilitarianism, for the US 
                                                 
54 James Lee-Steere, Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney 2 March to 9 April, 
1891, (University of Sydney Library, Scholarly Electronic Text and Image Service, 1999), 194. 
55 Harvey, “James Bryce, 'The American Commonwealth',” 370. 
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Constitution to function it is necessary that American politicians operate in the same spirit of 
republican idealism with which it was written. 
 The closest of the US Constitution's Amendments that ever made it into the Australian 
Constitution were clauses 80, 116, and 117, dealing with right of individuals to be tried by a jury of 
their peers, the right to freedom of religious observance, and the citizen's right to equality 
throughout the states. All three clauses in the 1891 draft were taken directly from the US 
Constitution, however each clause was later modified substantially.56 Clause 117 was rejected 
precisely because it so closely resembled the United States' 14th Amendment and, given the 
circumstances surrounding its creation, Australians, as noted by Cockburn in the Melbourne 
Convention in 1898, did not want to pay “the compliment of imitating it here.”57 Yet for the most 
part, Australia's founders believed they were forming a government “in the context of an advanced 
age of civilization, and they criticized the American language of natural rights as anachronistic...”58 
Both nations valued religious freedom, trial by jury, and equality for its citizens, but Australia, its 
colonies already governing themselves successfully for decades, had, through precedent, found no 
need for a Constitutional enforcement of these 'natural rights'. Australia, whilst adopting many of 
the structural federalist elements within the US Constitution, explicitly considered and then 
abandoned language to do with the enumeration and protection of individual rights. Due to the 
nature of America's origins as a society born through revolution but also infused culturally with the 
traditions and protections of English common law, the protections of these and other rights in their 
constitution – and the notion that these rights are still sufficiently prone to assault that they require 
constitutional protection – still shape them as a people and as a nation. 
 Beach wrote of Australia's new Constitution that “its legislation on economic and social 
                                                 
56 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 122. 
57 John Cockburn, Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates 3rd session, Melbourne, 20th 
January to 17th March, 1898, (University of Sydney Library, Scholarly Electronic Text and Image Service, 1999), 
686. 
58 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 122-123. 
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issues will suggest valuable and suggestive comparisons with our own.”59 From his 
contemporaneous assessment of Australia's Constitution from a distinctly American perspective, 
some insights into America's view of their own Constitution can be gleaned. Whilst noting that the 
type of federalism that Australia adopted was in line with the “American idea,” he points out that 
“the powers delegated to the Australian federal government are much fuller” than is the case with 
America, indicating that America's Constitution favours greater power for its individual component 
states.60 Through these “large and radical” powers given to the central government of Australia, he 
extrapolates that “the advance of the Australian colonies in the direction of 'state socialism' has been 
incorporated into the new federal plan of government.”61 Smaller powers, by comparison, for the 
US federal government indicate a deference towards states’ rights in the US Constitution. His 
reference to 'state socialism' marks it as being distinctive from America's experience, reinforcing 
America's commitment towards Laissez-faire economics and their inherent distrust of both state 
control and concentrated power. 
 
In the drafting of its Constitution, Australia examined and borrowed certain structural elements 
from the US Constitution but “omitted several key philosophical principles of the US Constitution, 
namely, natural rights, the separation of powers, virtue, corruption, and checks and balances.”62 
Wright also notes that “Despite its similarity to the US Constitution, modern commentators have 
noticed that the federal component of the Australian Constitution exhibits a curiously democratic 
character.”63 Australia produced its Constitution by examining American political structures whilst 
excluding the abstractions of American history from the process. By examining what Australia, a 
nation similar to America in areas such as its geographic size and its English heritage, did not adopt 
                                                 
59 Beach, "The Australian Federal Constitution," 680. 
60 Ibid, 670. 
61 Ibid, 680. 
62 Wright, "Anglicizing the United States Constitution,” 128. 
63 Ibid. 
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from the US Constitution we have been able to identify those elements of its Constitution that are 
peculiar to the United States, such as a commitment to the protection of individual rights; a 
commitment to republican principles through a balanced federalism; and, most importantly, a 
philosophical commitment to republican ideals. What is idiosyncratic to America's Constitution is 
not just the way its political structures are arranged, but the richness of America's history. Its 
Constitution is not just structurally singular – the way in which it is approached and enforced by its 
own people, infused with passion for the philosophical ideals and lessons of America's revolution, 
make it unique amongst Constitutions. 
 The US Constitution describes a system replete with multiple checks, balances, and veto 
points. That the republican spirit of America's founding, not just the structure of the institutions 
detailed within it, must be adhered to in order to avoid legislative gridlock goes some way towards 
explaining why the US Government is in such a state of dysfunction today, relative to any prior time 
in its history. 
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